What a Shareholder Buyout Agreement Has to Decide Before Anyone Wants Out

A fire extinguisher sitting in a wall bracket behind a small cabinet door that is closed.

A shareholder buyout agreement has to settle three things to be worth anything: who is obligated to buy, how the price is fixed, and where the money comes from. Texas law will enforce close to whatever the owners of a closely held corporation write, which means the statute will not rescue a term they left vague. Most agreements settle the first question, gesture at the second, and never reach the third.

The document matters most at the moment nobody planned for: a death, a divorce, a falling-out, an owner who wants out at a number the others think is absurd. By then it is the only thing standing between the company and an argument about what the company is worth.

Texas law supplies the menu, not the meal

Texas gives the shareholders of a corporation wide latitude to write their own rules. Under Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 21.101, shareholders may agree among themselves to restrict the board's discretion, govern distributions and voting power, provide for arbitration or deadlock resolution, and require the company to wind up on a specified event. The agreement has to live in the certificate of formation or bylaws approved by all shareholders, or in a written agreement signed by all of them and made known to the corporation.

Buyout mechanics sit in a different subchapter. Section 21.211 lists the transfer restrictions Texas treats as valid, and the list is broad: a right of first refusal in favor of the company or the other shareholders, an obligation on the company or another person to buy securities covered by a purchase-and-sale agreement, a consent requirement aimed at preventing a violation of law, a prohibition on transfers to a designated person or group that is not manifestly unreasonable, restrictions that preserve S corporation status or another tax advantage, and the two that do the real work in a buyout — a requirement that a holder sell a set amount of restricted securities to a named buyer, and a provision that makes that sale happen automatically.

What the statute does not do is tell a Texas corporation what a departing owner's shares are worth, or who has to find the cash. That is left entirely to the document. The same questions arise on the LLC and partnership side, where the restrictions live in the company agreement rather than in Chapter 21 — we have written separately about transfer restrictions in LLC and partnership agreements and about how redemption agreements price and pay for an exit.

A transfer restriction is safe against later holders only if it is noted where the statute requires

A buy-sell is only as good as its grip on the shares themselves. Under Section 21.213, a restriction is specifically enforceable against the holder, a successor or a transferee if the restriction is reasonable and is noted conspicuously on the certificate, or, for uncertificated shares, in the notice sent to the owner under Section 3.205. A restriction that is not noted that way is ineffective against a buyer for value who had no actual knowledge of it at the time of the transfer.

That makes the share certificates part of the agreement's machinery rather than an afterthought. An agreement sitting in the minute book while the certificates say nothing on their face is doing less work than the people who signed it believe.

The price term is where a shareholder buyout agreement usually gives way

Two approaches dominate, and each fails in its own direction. A formula fixed in the document is certain and goes stale: a multiple of earnings set when the company was young produces a number nobody believes a decade later, and the owner it favors will insist on it. A valuation run at the time of the trigger is current and slow, and it only works if the document says who appoints the appraiser, what standard of value applies, whether minority and marketability discounts come off, and what happens when two appraisers land far apart.

An agreement that says the shares will be valued by an independent appraiser and stops there has postponed the argument, not settled it.

Funding decides whether the price term is ever reached

A price nobody can pay is not a price. The usual funding methods are company-owned life insurance on each owner, an installment note from the company or the remaining owners, borrowed money, or some combination. The question the document has to answer is what happens when the funding falls short: whether the obligation converts to a note, at what rate and over what term, what security the departing owner holds, and whether the company can defer payments to stay inside a lender's covenants.

Insurance-funded redemptions carry a valuation consequence after Connelly

On June 6, 2024 the Supreme Court decided Connelly v. United States, 602 U.S. 257 (2024). A closely held corporation held life insurance on each of two brothers to fund the redemption of whichever died first. It was common ground that life-insurance proceeds payable to a corporation are an asset that increases the corporation's fair market value. The Court held unanimously that the company's obligation to redeem did not offset them: the contractual obligation to redeem the shares did not diminish the value of those shares. The Court was careful to say that redemption obligations are not necessarily liabilities that reduce a corporation's value, and decided only the question in front of it.

A hypothetical, to show where the gap opens

Two owners hold a Texas corporation equally. The operating business is worth $8 million. The buy-sell says that on the death of either owner the company redeems that owner's shares for $4 million, and the company carries $4 million of life insurance on each owner to fund it. One owner dies, the insurer pays, the company redeems, and the estate receives $4 million.

On Connelly's reasoning the company is not worth $8 million at that moment. The $4 million of proceeds is a corporate asset, and the redemption obligation does not subtract from it, so the company is worth $12 million and a 50 percent interest — before any argument about discounts — is worth $6 million. The estate receives $4 million and is valued on $6 million.

That gap is a design choice made years earlier, when the funding method was picked, and it is visible from the day the agreement is signed. This example is constructed, and it sets aside a separate question with its own requirements: whether a buy-sell price controls for estate tax purposes at all. In Connelly the surviving brother and the deceased brother's son agreed the redemption price between themselves rather than obtaining the outside appraisal the agreement called for.

What to look at in the agreement already in the file

Five things, in the order they tend to matter:

  1. Whether the buyer is obligated or merely has an option, and whether that changes with the trigger.
  2. Whether the triggers cover the events that actually occur: death, disability, divorce, bankruptcy, the end of employment, a voluntary exit.
  3. Whether the price is a formula, a process or a fixed number, and when it was last revisited.
  4. Whether a funding source is identified, and what the document does when it falls short.
  5. Whether the restriction is noted on the certificates, or in the notice required for uncertificated shares.

None of that is a view on any particular agreement, and the answers move with the company's size, its tax structure and how its owners are related to one another. Where the agreement does not hold, the dispute that follows is a business divorce, with the price fight moved from the document into a courtroom.

A buy-sell agreement gets read properly twice: when it is drafted, and when somebody invokes it. Years usually separate those two readings, and only the first one is a period in which anything can be changed. If yours was written before the company looked the way it does now, a read against the list above is worth the hour — and it is a better hour than the one spent on it after a trigger has already fired. Our corporate and transactional practice covers that review.

Disclaimer. This publication is provided by Amini & Conant, LLP for educational and informational purposes only and is not intended and should not be construed as legal advice. Should the reader seek further analysis of the subject matter or answers to specific questions about the subject matter, please contact the author at neema@aminiconant.com. This publication is considered advertising under applicable state laws.

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